



**Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the UN
Geneva**

**Statement by Mr. Muhammad Omar, First Secretary,
at 3rd meeting of Subsidiary Body 2 of the Conference on Disarmament
02 June 2022**

Mr. Coordinator,

Thank you for convening this meeting.

Pakistan associates itself with the statement on nuclear disarmament delivered by the distinguished delegation of Nigeria on behalf of the Group of 21. I wish to add further remarks in my national capacity.

In the last two meetings of this subsidiary body, delegations have shared important insights and proposals on range of issues that fall under the ambit of agenda item-2.

Delegations have pointed out accentuating factors of a deteriorating and fragile strategic environment, touched on reasons for erosion of existing norms, and delved into risks, triggers, transformational developments and dangers which could lower the threshold for a nuclear war.

We have also outlined the rationale for the mutually reinforcing nature of the strategic, normative and legal dimensions, their logical sequencing as well as their role and relevance in preventing a nuclear war.

It is only natural then that the curative measures are context specific and are necessary to help avert a potential nuclear conflict.

In my remarks today, I would like to build on my delegation's previous comments with a focus on the topic of legal measures relevant to the work of this subsidiary body i.e. prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

Mr. Coordinator,

It is obvious from these discussions that there are two interconnected pathways to achieve the objective of preventing a nuclear war i.e. one, pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and second pursuit of measures necessary to avert a nuclear war until the elimination of nuclear weapons. For both pathways, a number of legal measures are viable and should be pursued.

Many delegations including mine, have shared their perspective on one such measure related to fissile materials, with a clear preference for it to be a nuclear disarmament measures rather than a purely non-proliferation one.

In this context, I wish to recall the working paper submitted to the CD i.e CD/2036 in 2015. My delegation has periodically expounded its position in detail on the various interconnected elements of dealing with fissile materials for military purposes. Since the details of the paper and our statements are part of previous records, I will therefore not go into further details at this stage. I would just like to note that our position on the question of a fissile materials treaty remains unchanged, including its scope, nature, definitions, verification as well as legal and institutional arrangements.

A legal instrument on halting the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons would remain a non-starter without clearly stipulating inclusion of the existing stockpiles in its scope. As we have pointed out before, it is a fact that the Shannon Mandate does not explicitly cover the existing stocks and has far outlived its utility, validity or relevance as the basis for work in the CD.

My delegation's remarks on this aspect have been presented in detail during the last meeting of this Subsidiary Body as well.

Let me now turn to other legal measures under the two streams of work on prevention of nuclear war.

Mr. Coordinator,

Any dispassionate horizon scanning of the global security landscape presents a sobering picture. The drivers and impacts of a fraying strategic environment are obvious at the international and regional levels. Trust and confidence, which are essential ingredients of strategic stability, have fallen victim to the growing geo-political rivalries.

The build up of conventional and non-conventional weaponry is evident as is their means of delivery. Rapid advancements in and sophistication of military technologies are growing. Arms races are on the rise across air, land, sea, outer space and cyber domains.

This growing phenomenon of force multipliers requires steady guardrails to avert a nuclear conflict, either by design or miscalculation. An essential first step is to craft a global strategic restraint regime. The building blocks of this regime could constitute an array of legal measures.

Given the symbiotic relationship of regional and global security, let me cite Pakistan's longstanding proposal on a strategic restraint regime in South Asia, which still remains on the table. It comprises three inter-locking elements one, reciprocal measures for nuclear and missile restraint; two, balance between conventional forces; and three, peaceful resolution of all existing disputes.

An international strategic restraint regime can certainly benefit from this Strategic Restraint Regime proposal in the context of South Asia.

Mr. Coordinator,

In terms of legal measures, our future work on prevention of nuclear war should also focus on a legal instrument on Anti-Ballistic Missile systems and other destabilizing systems, including hypersonic weapons. Blurring of lines and intertwining of nuclear and conventional capabilities highlights the need for legal measures to institute reduction and balance of conventional forces along the lines of CFE Treaty.

Other measures could include: reducing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, their de-alerting and de-targeting. Apart from their normative value, these measures would also boost confidence among nuclear weapon possessor states, enhance trust and contribute directly to preventing a nuclear war.

My delegation also remains open to discussions on weapons and doctrines, including the role of extended nuclear deterrence and stationing of nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear weapon states, in support of concluding the four concrete legal measures outlined above.

Recommendations from this subsidiary body to formally take up work on these measures to prevent a nuclear war would be a tangible and responsible contribution in the fraught strategic environment that we continue to witness globally and across various regions. We sincerely hope that under your guidance we are able to achieve this as a concrete outcome.

Finally, **Mr. Coordinator**, I wish to thank you for circulating and for seeking inputs on the second draft of SB-2 report. My delegation has shared its inputs and looks forward to the circulation of the next draft.

As we have pointed out before, the subsidiary body's report should logically follow the structure and format of the meetings in line with your proposal. At the same time, the report should reflect a comprehensive and balanced approach in terms of its treatment of topics, proposals, and considerations presented and discussed in this subsidiary body.

Generally speaking, my delegation would also favour all reports of the subsidiary bodies following a similar approach and methodology, in line with the mandate contained in decision CD/2229.

My delegation remains confident in adopting such a report by consensus.

I thank you.
